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Targeting Arab/Muslim/ 
South Asian Americans: 
Criminalization and Cultural Citizenship 
Louise Cainkar and Sunaina Maita 
Introduction 
Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians have been the primary targets 
of the U.S. government's global War on Terror since the Septem­
ber 11, 2001 attacks.1 Those who live in the United States are no ex­
ception. They have been subjected to extensive "security" mea� 
sures since the attacks, their rights undermined if not revoked 
by new policies .. hastily passed legislation, and selective la\v en­
forcement.2 They have been portrayed in the mainstream media 
and by a number of U.S. government officials as citizen-suspects 
who lie outside American cultural norms, and as communities 
that harbor "sleeping" terrorists, posing a threat to the nation1s 
security. In this essay, we focus on how Arabs, Muslims, and 
South Asians have been framed and targeted through a process 
of criminalization that represents tRem as members of a deviant 
group whose belief system is distinctly IIforeign" and opposed to 
core American values. Members of this group are presumed to 
inherently support criminal actions defined as IIterrorist" activity. 
We argue that the ideological process of criminalization leads to 
the exclusion of Arab and South Asian Muslim Americans from 
full national belonging, or cultural citizenship. 
In this essay, we further explore the responses of Arab and 
South Asian Muslim communities to the War on Terror, and ask 
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whether these responses reveal alliance-building and pan-ethnic 
identification. Do the targeted groups, now' portrayed as mono­
lithic, find solidarity with each other, and if so, what are the bases 
for their sense of affinity? These questions force us to consider 
deeper issues of pan-ethnic and political affiliation that highlight 
quandaries at the core of Asian American studies: how does a 
pan-ethnic approach challenge or support the racial and cultural 
categories used by state and empire to subordinate and divide 
populations? Are there fruitful linkages that can be made be­
tween Asian American and Arab American studies that could il­
lunlinate these processes of social classification and shed light on 
geographic, national, and racial boundaries? Such questions are 
central to the vision and purpose of Asian American and Arab 
American studies. We seek to draw attention to common experi­
ences between the subjects of Asian American and Arab Ameri­
can studies to provide a critique of the conventional' boundaries 
established by ethnic and area studies, to uncover their link to state 
policies, and to bring forth a more radical vision for our intellec­
tual work in the post-9/ 11 moment. 
Criminalization and Cultural Citizenship 
Our argument hinges on the use of two major analytic concepts, 
criminalization and cultural citizenship, and their relationship to 
each other, to explain the targeting of Arabs, South Asians, and 
Muslims in the U.s. after 9/11. We define criminalization as a pro"­
cess by which the state creates and enforces penalties for actions 
that it claims violate public safety. Our critique of crimina liz a­
tion centers on state policies objectively unrelated to actual pub­
lic harm and on selective enforcement of laws so that particular 
groups are penalized, but not others. Criminalization is often dis­
cussed in relation to s\veeps, as when police usweep" certain ar­
eas of homeless persons before major events,3 or "sweep" youth 
preemptively off street corners, and clearances, through \vhich 
authorities "clear" members of targeted groups to carry on 'with 
daily life activities, a process expressed in the term "driving 
while Black." Criminalized groups are often tracked and moni­
tored. While the state attempts to legitimate these policies by 
claiming that the groups targeted are a public safety threat, in 
practice, their implementation reveals more than anything the 
powerlessness of the targeted groups. The War on Crime, the 
War on Drugs, and no\v the War on Terror share these features 
of criminalization processes.4 Features of the domestic War on 
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Terror that criminalize the innocent through s\,:,"eeps, clearances, 
and monitoring, include dragnet arrests, undercover activities at 
mosques, and Special Registration of Muslim men. 
Criminalization and cultural citizenship are related as they 
are both embedded in power relations and in processes of disci­
pliningsubjects by the state through law, policy, and cultural and 
social categorizations. Cultural citizenship is defined as the ev­
eryday experience of belonging to the nation-state in relation to 
experiences of inclusion and exclusion. Citizenship has tradition� 
ally been thought of in political, economic, and civic terms,S but 
more recent analyses focus on the notion of cultural citizenship. 
As multiethnic societies are forced to confront questions of differ­
ence that undergird social inequality, it has become clear that the 
rights and obligations onegal citizenship are mediated by race, eth­
nicity, gender, and sexuality, as well as religion . These social loca­
tions-as much or more than legal citizenship-affect the extent to 
which a group feels and acts like a member of the nation-state in 
which it resides.6 Cultural citizenship, according to anthropolo­
gist Lok Siu, consists of the "behaviors, discourses, and practices 
that give meaning to citizenship as lived experience" in the con­
text of "an uneven and complex field of structural inequalities," 
the "quotidian practices of inclusion and exclusion ."7 
Latino studies scholars Renato Rosaldo, William Flores, and 
Rina Benmayor developed the concept of cultural citizenship to 
connect the cultural and civil rights of immigrants to new social 
movements.s Their approach to cultural citizenship analyzes "how 
cu.1tural phenomena-from practices that organize the daily life 
of individuals, families, and the community, to linguistic and ar­
tistic expression-cross the political realm and contribute to the 
process of affirming and building an emerging Latino identity 
and political and social consciousness."9 Others, such as Aihwa 
Ong, are concerned with the process by \vhich the state regulates 
individual behaviors and beliefs about national belonging. Ong 
defines cultural citizenship as Iia dual process of self-making and 
being-made within webs of power linked to the nation-state and: 
civil society."10 
Cultural citizenship is linked to the process of criminaliza­
Hon because t�e precursor and outcome of group criminalization 
is cultural and pblitical exclusion from the nation-state. Arab 
and South Asian Muslims in the U.S. have beeh denied their rights 
not only by official state policies, but also by representations that 
have construed these groups as outside the bounds of U.S. cul-
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tural citizenship. Groups with political power lie inside the cul­
tural norm of national belonging and have the power to prevent 
policy-making that ,vould criminalize themselves. Cultural rep­
resentations of Arabs and Muslims,.in particular, draw on dis­
tinctions between a presumably superior "Western" civilization 
and an exotic and supposedly barbaric uMuslim \vorId." These 
ideas justify discriminatory state policies as well as U.S. military 
interventions in a broadly defined Middle East, the geographies 
of the "clash between civilizations ." Arabs and Muslims in the 
West are portrayed in this Orientalist \vorldview as inherently 
foreign, essentially unassimilable, and a potential enemy \vith­
in.l1 
Why have Arab and South Asian Muslims in the United 
. States been selected for criminalization by state policies and ex­
clusion from cultural citizenship? We argue that the U.S. govern­
ment has targeted these groups both before and after 9/ 11 be­
cause of its particular political interests in the regions fronl which 
these communities originate. The criminalization of these groups 
is linked to the rise of the U.s. as a global po·wer and to silencing 
dissent of its foreign policy objectives. Since 9/ 11, they have pro­
vided an internal and external scapegoat for the nation's foreign 
policy failures, the perceived sense of vulnerability of its inhabit­
ants, and its inability to protect its citizens. Excluding Arab and 
South Asian Muslims from cultural citizenship and criminaliz­
ing their communities is the ideological and practical work that 
builds popular support for sacrificing their civil rights for the 
presumed sense of safety of the majority, links them to "enemy" 
nations and combatants, and delegitimizes their dissent. Isolated 
as potentially disloyal, in part using notions of essential cultural 
difference that are diffused through the mainstream media and 
in popular culture representations, the profiling arid criminal­
ization of these groups by the state is tolerated by the public. 
Arabs, Muslim, and South Asian Americans become accepted as 
cultural outsiders, so that what happens to them is (falsely) seen 
as not affecting anyone else. In the process, the state whittles 
away one democratic right after another, so that prolonged and 
secret detentions, detention without charge, and even torture of 
detainees become acceptable state practices in the name of Una-
tional security." 
Before 9/11, about 80 percent of the American public thought 
it was \vrong for law enforcement to use racial profiling, a term 
popularly used to refer to the disproportionate targeting of Af-
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attacks, a majority of the American public favored racial profil­
ing, Uat least as long as it \vas directed at Arabs and Muslims."12 
Many also believed it ,vas better to limit the presence of Arabs 
and Muslims in the United St�tes. A March 2002 CNN /Gallup/ 
USA Today poll found that nearly 60 percent of Americans fa­
vored reducing the number of Muslim immigrants admitted to 
the United States.13 Negative and racist media portrayals of Ar­
abs and South Asian Muslims lent ongoing support to domestic 
and global state policies so that an October, 2002 ABC News/Be­
Befnet poll found that the proportion of American adults holding 
an unfavorable view of Islam had risen from 24 percent to 33 
percent in the nine months from January to October 2002.14 As 
recently as December 2004, Cornell University found that near­
ly 50 percent of respondents in a national poll believed the U.S. 
government should curtail civil liberties for Muslim Americans.1s 
The racial profiling of Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians by the 
state is akin to a form of Green McCarthyism, as Vijay Prashad 
points out, and is not just a version of the common, domestic form 
of racial profiling. While the notion of race has always been an 
ambiguous social construct in the U.S., it is also true that domes­
tic racialization policies have been linked to the state's interna­
tional policies, in addition to its domestic agendas,16 
Arab American communities have endured racial profiling 
by the state for years, because of U.S. foreign policies in the Arab 
\vorld, specifically tied to U.S. support of the Israeli occupation of 
Palestine. Well before 9/ 11, Arab Americans experienced special 
legislation and policing actions aimed at pro-Palestinian politi­
cal activists 'whose main outcome has been to stifle their voices 
in American political debate.17 Nonviolent activists have been 
spied on and threatened ,vith deportation, including naturalized 
U.S. citizens. As was characteri�tic of state-sponsored repression 
during the McCarthy era and Hoover's FBI, lawful challenges 
to U.S. policies (this time related to the Middle East) became an 
obsessive target of U.S. intelligence agencies. For such instances,! 
see the documentation of Operation Boulder and the Los Angeles 
8 case.tS Consecutive pieces of anti-terrorism legislation that re­
placed anti-communist laws with laws that mainly targeted Ar­
abs, and the historic exclusion of Arabs from political campaigns, 
including the return of Arab-American campaign donations, have 
assured a silenced Arab American community in which many 
are fearful of expressing dissent.19 
5 
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Post-9/11 Policies of Criminalization 
The U.S. government implemented a broad range of administra­
tive, legislative, and judicial measures in the name of national 
security and the War on Terror after the attacks of September 11, 
with little public debate. Among these were: mass arrests, secret 
and indefinite detentions, prolonged detention of ILmaterial wit­
nesses," closed hearings, secret evidence, eavesdropping on attor­
ney�client conversations, FBI horne and work visits, wiretapping, 
property sei.zures, selective removals of aliens with technical visa 
violations, and mandatory Special Registration. At least 100,000 
Arabs and South Asian Muslims living in the United States have 
personally experienced one of these measures.20 Twenty-five of 
the thirty-seven known U.S. government security initiatives im­
plemented in the eighteen months after the September 11 attacks 
explicitly or implicitly targeted Arabs and South Asian Muslims 
in the United States.21 This legal and political context has been 
augmented by sensationalized media portrayals of Muslims, 
strong anti-Muslim/anti-Islamic rhetoric from the political right, 
and continued public backlash, evidenced in hate crimes, hate 
speech, and job discrimination. Arab and South Asian Muslims 
report beifig 'marginalized as lithe other" in American society by 
policies that have singled them out as a group that is dangerotls 
and potentially subversive; they express serious concerns about 
their civil rights and safety under these conditionsP 
The U.S. Congress diminished the civil rights of all Ameri­
cans when it hastily passed the USA Patriot Act (Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001), crafted by the 
executive branch, in October 2001.23 The USA Patriot Act ex­
pands the power of the U.S. government to use surveillance and 
wiretapping without first showing probable cause, permits se­
cret searches and access to private records by government agents 
without oversight, authorizes the detention of immigrants on al­
leged suspicions, denies admission to the United States because 
of a person's speech, and expands the concept of guilt by associa­
tion, among other erosions of basic civil rights. The overwhelm­
ing majority of known uses of these powers have been exercised 
on Arab and South Asian Muslims in the U.S. Comparing the 
government's response to the September 11 attacks to the 1919 
Palmer Raids, World War II internment of persons of Japanese 
descent, and Cold War McCarthyism, legal scholar David Cole 
identifies the targeting of immigrants and vulnerable groups; 
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Cambridge' rally bya coalition of organizations, including South Asian Com­
mittee on Human Rights, to oppose Special Registration for i'v1uslim males, 
August 2, 2003. 
Photograph by Louise Cainkar 
fOCllS on political speech, political activity, and group identity; 
.andreliance on broad sweeps instead of foe-llsed, objectiveinves­
tigations into the behavior of individuals as common elements. 
These types of sweeping measures have in the past led to H n1is­
guided. enforcement directed at political dissidents rather than crirrtinals. "24 
Imrn.ediately after the 9/11 attacks, sorne 1,200 citizens and 
non-citizens, ahnost exclusively Arab and South Asian 11uslirrt 
m.ales, were swept up and detained under high security condi­
tions.2S Their identities are largely unknown because the fed­
eral government has not released this lnformation. More than 
500,vere picked up for technical visa violations and eventually 
deported after being cleared of terrorist connections.26 Special 
security checks and ren10val fron1 airplanes -rNere im.plemented 
for Arab and South Asian men presumed to be Muslims trav­
eling through U.S. airports. "Flying while Arab" was the title 
of a piece in the February 2002 issue of Arab-A'merican Business 
Mag�zine, describing the�e experiences as the airborne equiva­
lent of II driving while Black." 1J\lhile the mass arrests and, airline 
profiling started decreasingin rrd -2002, Arabs and South Asian 
Muslims have continued to feel under siege because of ongoing 
hc)me and business raids, FBI interviews, spying, and wiretap­
ping, fear over the crirninalization of charitable donations, and 
Supplied by The British Library - "The world1s knowledge" 
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banking policies that have forced closure of some of their private 
. and business accounts.27 
The federal government's actions since 9/11 have led the 
American civil rights community to protest that it has over­
stepped its legitimate power in its mission to secure the U.S. and 
its borders.28 Legal experts point out that the state has engaged 
in measures that are "unnecessary, unconstitutional, and coun· 
terproductive."29 Many question whether selling "a vulnerable 
minority's rights ... in the name of security" has made the coun­
try safer, let alone \vhether this is even morally justifiable for a 
presumably democratic sOciety.3D The national security benefit of 
all these measures is highly questionable. An analysis of the out­
comes of nlore than 300 terrorism·related cases completed since 
9/11 shows a pattern of plea-bargained convictions on charges 
uruelated to terrorism.31 When removal (deportation) is easier than 
proving a case, as in the case of non-citizens, the government has 
often taken the former option. . 
Special Registration: A Policy 
of Tracking and Removal 
One selectively enforced and discriminatory federal policy is the 
U.S. government's "Special Registration" program. On Septem­
ber 11, 2002�the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 
then part of the Department of Justice, implemented this track­
ing and clearance program, requiring II certain non-immigrant 
aliens" to register with the U.S. immigration authorities, be fin­
gerprinted and photographed, respond to questioning, and sub­
mit to regular reporting.3! The targeted aliens were male visitors 
aged 16 .. 64 from twenty-three Muslim-majority countries in Asia 
and the Arab world, plus heavily Muslim Eritrea and North Ko­
rea. Special Registration was required of persons already in the 
United States and those newly entering the country. The program's 
stated purpose \-vas to facilitate the "monitoring" of these aliens 
"in the interest of national security."l3 INS fliers had THIS NO­
TICE IS FOR YOU splayed across the top, suggestive of the call­
in notices posted for Japanese Americans living in the Western 
United States during World War II. 
According to the Department of Homeland Security, 82,880 
persons living in the United States had been "sp�ciaIly" regis­
tered by June 1, 2003 through call-in registration. Of these men 
who \villingly complied ,vith the state's monitoring program, 
13,434 were placed in removal (deportation) proceedings for visa 
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violations, after they were cleared of connections to terrorism.3t 
Another 127,694 persons were registered at their U.S. Port of 
Entry.35 Out of more than 200,000 persons registered by Special 
Registration, only eleven \vere charged with security-related of­
fenses, cases for which the outcome is not yet known. 
The arrest and detention of some 800 voluntary registrants 
during the first phase of the program in Southern California sparked 
nationwide protest. Persons seeking to comply \vith the rules 
were handcuffed and led off to jail for visa violations; some re­
ported verbal abuse and body cavity searches. Detainees were 
forced to sleep on concrete floors, in group holding cells. Most 
of these early detainees from Special Registration were Iranian 
professionals and their family members who had not returned 
to Iran after the Islamic revolution. They were working taxpay­
ers \vith families who had othenvise lived lawfully (except for 
visa status issues) in the United States for decades. Quite a few 
had pending applications for permanent residency.36 Aware that 
their visa status was problematic, they registered to demonstrate 
their la\y abidance and lack of culpability for any acts of terror. 
Their keepers, however, had only the homogenized image of the 
guilty Muslim in their minds. Eventually, most of these detain­
ees 'were released on bail and placed in removal (deportation) 
proceedings by the INS. The relatively affluent class position and 
organized nature of the Iranian American community in Los An­
geles enabled them to draw attention to their plight by launch­
ing a successful and speedy media campaign and string of pro­
tests around the country. The director of the Southern California 
chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) said the 
arrests \yere "reminiscent of the internment of Japanese Ameri­
cans during World War 11."37 
The Special Registration program was a massive round up of 
out-of-status Arabs, Asians, and North Africans from predomi­
nantly Muslim countries with few historical precedents in its 
scale.3S It used the selective enforcement of immigration laws to 
target members of these groups for deportation, although they ' 
comprised less than one percent of the estimated three million 
persons who were II out of status" and the eight million undocu­
mented in the United States.39 In addition , tens of thousands of 
Arabs and South Asians fled the United States rather than submit 
to Special Registration's tracking mechanisms. In Chicago, New 
York, and other cities, Pakistani neighborhoods and businesses ap­
peared to .be vacated almost overnight. Some families fled to the 
Supplied by The British Library - "The world's knowledge" 
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Canadian border seeking political asylum. 
After stating for months that the Special Registration program 
was not discriminatory because it would be eventually expanded 
to include all visiting aliens, the U.S. government announced the 
progranl's phase out in May 2003. Government authorities never 
clearly explained why persons from these twenty-five countries 
were selected for the Special Registration program. At times .. the 
government stated that the countries whose citizens and nation­
als were required to register ,vere selected because of the pres­
ence of Al Qaeda, although countries with no known Ai Qaeda pres­
ence 'were included and countries with a proven Ai Qaeda pres­
ence, such as Germany and England, ,vere excluded. Broader 
Bush administration programs to monitor Muslims who are U.S. 
citizens include then FBI Director Robert Mueller's initiative to 
base FBI goals for wire-tapping and undercover activities on the 
number of mosques in an area.40 
Because the Special Registration program targeted persons 
by their country of birth, it shares features of the family of U.S. 
policies based on ideas about race (beginning with slavery and 
Indian removal), such as the 1790 Naturalization Law, which de­
nied naturalized citizenship to non-whites (repealed in 1952); the 
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act (repealed in 1943)i the Asia Barred 
Zone (enacted in 1917 and revoked in 1952); and immigration quo­
tas (enacted in 1921.. revised in 1924 and ended in 1965). When 
immigration quotas were abolished in 1965, it signaled the end 
of an era in which U.S. immigration policies were based princi­
pally on race. Thereafter, it was considered against liberal demo­
cratic principles to blatantly discriminate by country of birth. In 
1981, however, pennission to regulate persons from certain Hforeign 
states" re-emerged in immigration legislation, allowing the attor­
ney general to require "natives of any one or more foreign states, 
or any class of group thereof" to provide an address and other 
information upon ten days notice. The Iran crisis of 1980 ,vas 
specifically mentioned in the House Judiciary Committee report 
submitted for the 1981 law, which stated, "immediate access to 
records of non-immigrants may be vital to our nation's secu­
rity."41 Thus, the authority to implement selective immigration 
procedures tied to country of birth \vas linked to U.S. strategic in­
terests in the Middle East even before 9/11, and is tied to Ameri­
can concerns about Islamist movements and the Iranian revolu­
tion. Attorney General Ashcroft used this 1981 Jaw, as well as 
precedents dating back to the 1790 Aliens and Seditions Acts, to 
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Even prior to Special Registration, more Arabs and South Asian CJ :lm 0--
led Muslims (none accused of terrorist connections) had been removed � c 
:he from the United States as a consequence of the September 11 at- � 3" 
ler tacks than the number of foreign nationals deported for their po- -Vl 
ies litical beliefs following the infamous 19191?almer Raids. The De-
c c ,.... 
the partment of Justice Inspector General's report confirmed at least :r » 
565 persons removed for visa violations from among those swept .." )n- p,;" 
up immediately after.the 9/11 attacks.o ::l es- � 
'es- 3 Hate Crimes: Indicators of ttl ., es-· Ideological Penetration in Popular Culture 
n" tlJ 
:ler ::l VI 
T.S. Public backlash against suspect members of Arab and South Asian 
� to Muslim communities, who lie outside the parameters of cultur-
the aI citizenship, manifests itself in hate crimes, hate speech, and 
job discrimination. In the first seven days fol lowing September 
)ns II, 2001, Arabs and South Asians reported 645 "bias incidents 
1.S. and hate crimes" to the Council on American-Islamic Relations 
lnd (CAIR).'" At end of six months, the figure rose to 1717, then de-
de- clined to 325 reported incidents in the second six-month periodY 
the CAIR characterized the post 9/11 anti-Muslim attacks· as more 
red violent than those of prior years, indicating they were not a ne\v 
1l0- phenomenon, and noted that they included a number of mur-
len ders. In 2002, CAIR noted increasing reports of discrimination, . 
�nd especially in the workplace and by government agents conduct-
lci- ing raids, interrogations, searches, and property seizures; by 2003 
no- reports of these incidents and hate crimes had increased 70 per-
In cent over 2002.46 In Chicago, more than 100 hate crimes against 
ign Arabs and South Asian Muslims, as well as persons mistaken for 
tor- them, \vere reported to the Chicago Commission on Human Re-
tes, lations by the end of December 2001.47 In addition, several Arab 
her and South Asian Muslim institutions were attacked. On Septem-
vas ber 12, 2001, a mob of hundreds of angry whites, some shouting, 
,art "kill the Arabsu and wielding 'weapons, commenced a march 
; to to the largest, predominantly Arab mosque in Chicagoland.43 A' 
cu- predominantly South Asian and Arab mosque in suburban Villa 
:ion Park was vandalized in the spring of 2003, and attempts to build 
: in- two ne\v suburban mosques met with strong community opposi-
eri- tion in 2004.49 
>lu- In the ITIonths immediately following the September 11 at-
I as tacks, Muslim women in Chicago repeatedly reported having their 
:, to head scarves yanked off or being spit at on the street.50 These inci-
11 
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dents still occu� although with less frequency, and fear still exists 
within local Arab and Muslim communities. Similar stri kes on 
Muslim women have occurred nationally. For example, on Octo­
ber 5, 2003, a Muslim \vornan wearing a hijab (head scarf) was at­
tacked in a K-Mart parking lot in Springfield, Virginia. The white 
male teenage attacker allegedly shouted, Hyou terrorist pig," 
before running away. Many community leaders blame the U.S. 
government's s\veeping and unfocused actions in their commu­
nities, and the media's sensational coverage of the "war on ter­
rorism," for encouraging anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiment. 
Arab and South Asian Muslim concerns remain about profiling, 
intolerance, and the long-term effects of discrimination.51 
Islamophobia 
Islamophobi a is a persistent strain of essentialist ideologie s that 
criminalize Arabs, South Asians, and Muslims by claiming that 
these groups deviate from normative cultural citizenship and pose 
a threat to the nation.52 As' ad AbuKhalil points out that embed­
ded in these anti-Muslim views is the phenomenon of IItheologo­
centrism," by which anti-Muslim scholars and politicians explain 
all political behaviors of Muslims or Arabs by reference to the 
Qurall.53 Neoconservative and Christian right spokespersons rou­
tinely express displeasure with the idea of American society em­
bracing Muslims. They describe Islam as a religion outside the 
pale of human values and some have labeled Muslims as uworse 
than Nazis/'s.! Evangelists Lind and Weyrich, in a booklet titled 
WJzy Islam is a Threat to America alId tile West, argue that Muslims 
IIshould be encouraged to leave. They are a fifth column in this 
country."55 
Community Impact of State Policies 
In order to show the ways in which state policies have affected 
specific communities of Arabs, South Asians, and Muslims \ve 
briefly examine two urban areas, Chicago and Cambridge/Bos­
ton. It is interesting to juxtapose findings from South Asian, Arab, 
and Muslim communities in these two locales, which have been 
discussed much less than New York in the context of post-9/11 
issues, and wh ich have their own political, ethnic, and religious 
landscapes. We focus on the experiences of women in  Chicago 
and youth in the Boston area, building on our own research ex­
pertise, in order to shed light on the ways in which post-9/11 
targeting has shaped experiences of gender and generation. 
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Metropolitan Chicago 
Metropolitan Chicago is h ome to a diverse Muslim community 
of around 400,000, including African Americans, South A sians, 
Arabs, East Europeans, and a growing number of c onver ts, an d 
has s ome sixty m osque s. Backlash for the 9/11 attacks be gan 
almost immediately with ve rbal attacks on persons assumed to 
be Arab or Muslim, phy sical assaults, phone threats, and arson 
of Muslim institutions. In research conducted for a post 9/11 
impact study funded by the Russell Sage Fo un dati on, a m aj ority 
of Arabs and Muslims in Chica go reported feeling that they w ere 
living in a state of siege for fu lly three years after the terr or ist at-
tacks of 2001. 
Interviews wit h young, college-educated, middle-class Arab-
American wo men, who are part of the larger study's sample, show 
that their liv es w er e dr amatic aly ch an ge d by t he events of9/11. 
Short ly after the 9/11 attacks, one woman \vea ri ng a llijab was 
verb ally assaulted when a \vornan in the car next to her shouted; 
IIIf I had a gun 1'd shoot you n ow!" Other women re po rted their 
veils being ripped off their heads. Women who wear the hijab re-
ported that Uthe stares, the refusal to look me in the face, and the 
verbal insults" pe rs isted years after the attacks. Nearly all women 
interviewed, mulzajibaat (vei le d) or not, still s ay they fear for their 
safety when they are in pl ace s that lack ethnic diversity or areas 
that are all white. One Arab Muslim woman said, "You won't find 
me ih a p ark or a forest pre se rv e," while an othe r said, "Soccer 
moms scare me the most." All a gre ed that Muslim women who 
wear the lrijab arc the most vulnerable to assault in Amer ic an so-
dety, because they are so e as ily spotted and targeted. 
Feeling unsafe is not limited to the public sphere. The federal 
govern me nt' s pattern of interrogations, a rre st s, home invas ions, 
spying, and property confiscations appear random, un foc us ed, 
and discriminatory to members of the Arab and Muslim c om-
munity. T he government's use of secretevidence, closed h earin gs, 
eavesdropping on attorneys, and special registration of Arabs and 
South Asian Muslims have not built commu nity confidence in 
the government, or in the claim that i ts only target is terrorists and 
people who support them. As a consequence, nearly everyone in 
the c ommun ity feels vulnerable to a certain degree, even in their 
own homes. Consider that after the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement 
authorities received 96,000 anonymous tips from persons report-
ing on Arab, South Asian, and Muslim neighbors.56 
Post-9/11 racism has spilled over into the work site and in job 
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discrimination against Muslims in Chica go as well. Some women 
report they are forced to listen to anti-Arab jokes and anti-Muslim 
comments at v{ork. Others must face off-the-cuff remarks such 
as: Ills that a bomb in your briefcase?" A few ,v ome n  re ported 
l os ing their closest \vork colleagues after 9 / 11, ,vhen suddenly 
all Muslims were suspect. Many women say they are afraid 
to cha nge jobs for fear that they will not find a new employer. 
Some report choosing to h ide their Arab and Mus lim identity on 
the job, pos in g as Greeks or Italians. There is no doubt that the 
Jzijab will prove to be a major barrier to employment and promo­
tion for Muslim women. 
IIWe are in a desperate situation. We were isolated from others 
and w� need to build brid ges," sa id one Chica go Muslim commu­
nity leader. Post-9/ 11 formations within the Muslim community 
in Ch ica go revea l u nprecedented p an-Isl amic boundary crossing. 
This is perhaps best exemplified in Radio Islam, inau gurated 
in late 2004. Radio Islam's prod ucers, researchers, and emcees 
span the ra nge of African-American, Asian, Arab, A.frican, and 
European Musl ims. Their topics are similarly pan-Islamic and 
global. Pan,-Islamic activities are also underway in civil ri ghts 
organizin g and defense, in the health care arena, among Mus li m 
social ,vorkers, and in domestic violence p revention. The pre­
dominantly Arab Brid gevie\v mosque hosted Chinese American 
Muslim James Vee, the former Musli m chap lain at Guantanalno 
Bay who Was falsely accused of espionage by the government. 
The case Qf now exonerated James Vee, and the efforts of his mili­
tary collea gues at Guantanamo Bay to criminalize his actions, is a 
classic example of hOlV profiling can transform everyday actions 
into supposed criminal behavior. Even greater boundary .cross­
ing can be expected from the organized activ ities of second- gen­
eration Muslims, who are less constrained by affinities of culture 
and la ngua ge than their immi grant parents. 
Interfaith alliances also surfaced in Chicago during the post-
9 / 11 period as grassroots interfaith activists formed a protec­
tive circle around the Bridgeview mosque in the days after the 
9 / 11 attacks. Imm igrant ri ghts coalitions and civil ri ghts groups 
strengthened their working relationships with Ch ica go'S Arab, 
South Asian, and Muslim communities because of shared con­
cerns over the government's poli cies. To gether they protested the 
government's Spe cial Registration program and deportations, 
assenlbling with banners at the federal b uildin g and offering sup­
port to registtees. Gi ve n  their pre-9/ 11 experiences of subordi-
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nation and federal government profiling, Chicago's Arab com-
munity already had strong ties ,yUh National Lawyers Guild 
attorneys and progressive ethnic coalitions. These external al-
1iances are particularly important since A rab, Sou th Asian, and 
Muslim community resources have been redirected and exten-
sively depleted after 9 / 11 due to the financial demands of legal 
defense and civil rights ,york. There is less evidence, however, 
of the critical next step, ,�hen communities of Lati nos, Afri can 
Americans, Arabs, and South Asians 'would march together for 
their common interests. This type of solidari ty requ ires another 
level of work that must emerge from within Arab, South Asian, 
African American and Latino grassroots community organiza-
tions and is complicated by class-based relationships between 
and among the�e groups . 
The fault lines, as well as potential fluidity, of traditional Asian 
American organizing were widely evident after 9 / 11, when the 
Chicago Commission on Human Relations Arab Affairs Commis-
. sion took actions to represent Asian hate crime victims because 
the Asi an Commission had not historically concerned itself with 
issues affecting South or West Asians. Similarly, Afghanis, Irani-
ansI and Pakistanis who 'were called in for Special Registration in 
Chicago found no larger ethnic or geographically based organi .. 
zation to defend them. Fitting neatly into neither Arab nor Asian 
categories, as these two pan-ethnic groups have been tradition-
ally defined and organized in the U.S., they found themselves 
without any representation to challenge their treatment. Post-
9 / 11 experiences have drawn these groups together, transcend-
ing traditional boundaries of race and geography, which they had 
no role in establishing. 
Boston 
In the af termath of 9 1 11, it became apparent that Arab and South 
Asi an Muslim youth in the U.S. were being dramatically forced to 
confront their belonging in the nation-state. This section focuses 
in particular on South Asian Muslim immigrant youth and draws 
on findings from an ethnographic study conducted in 2001-2003 
of working-class, Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi immig rant 
students in the public high school in Cambridge, Massachusetts 
and the impact of 9 / 11 on their notions of cultural citizenship.57 
The research also involv ed intervi ews with immigrant parents, 
school staff, community and religious leaders, city officials, and 
community activists. 
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The Ca.mbridge public high school has an extremely diverse 
student body that reflects the city's changing population, with 
students from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia.58 
The South Asian immigrant student population is predominant­
ly working- to lower-middle class and most work after school in 
part-time jobs in the service sector, such as fast food or retail. The 
majority of the Indian immigrant youth are from Sunni Muslim 
families, most from small towns or villages in Gujarat in Western 
India. 
While local Muslim organizations or mosques in the Boston 
area draw a diverse Arab, North Africanl, Asian, and African Ameri­
can population, the families of these working-class South Asian 
inunigrant youth tend to socialize mainly with people from their 
own ethnic community. Furthermore, they generally do not affil­
iate with the Indian·American or Pakistani American community 
organizations in the Boston area either, which tend to involve 
middle- to upper-middle class, suburban families.59 In some in­
stances, class boundaries within South Asian American commu­
nities persisted and undermined community cohesiveness after 
9 lit and often those who truly were most vulnerable and could 
not afford legal counsel did not have the support of community 
organizations led by South Asian elites. The anti .. MusIim and Hin­
du nationalist sentiment that has existed among segments of the 
Indian immigrant community as the Hindu Right has become a 
powerful movement in India, 'was one of the factors underlying the 
failure of many Indian American organizations to support or de­
fend their Muslim compatriots, other than paying mere lip service. 
For example, the Indian Association of Greater Boston, the Pakistani 
Association of Greater Boston, as well as regional organizations 
representing the sizeable Gujarati community in the Boston area 
tended to serve middle- and upper-middle class families gener­
ally living in the suburbs. The Gujarati organizations were pre­
donlinantly Hindu in membership and so did not include any of 
the Gujarati Muslim families in Cambridge. Given the massacre 
of Muslims in Gujarat in Spring 2002, religion is a highly charged 
issue within the Indian imnligrant community. One of the Gujara- ' 
ti leaders interviewed for this study refused to comment on the 
inclusion of Muslims in his organization; other Indian commu­
nity leaders were less defensive and some had even participated 
in marches for peace in South Asia during the military conflict on 
the Indo-Pakistani border and so presumably were more critical 
of communalism or nationalism in South Asia. However, in gen-
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rse eral, it was apparent that class cleavages and religious tensions enl- � 
'ith bedded in homeland politics contributed to a sense of isolation � 0--
a.58 for some South Asian Muslims and to a highlighting, rather than $; c 
. nt- erosion, of fissures within some Indian American communities . � �r 
1 in It i s  possible that the state's racial profiling of Muslims coin- -l/') 
�he ciding with anti:..MusIim sentiments within South Asian commu· 0 c: ...... 
lim nities could strengthen Muslim or pan-Islamic identity among :r » 
�rn the younger generation of South Asian immigrants, as happened II'> c;. 
for an earlier generation of South Asian Muslim youth in Britain.60 :::l » 
ton In their daily lives, South Asian immigrant youth do, in fact, hang 3 (1) 
�ri- out 'with Muslim African youth, especially, 'who are from Soma-
� 
;::;. � 
ian lia, Ethiopia, or Egypt, forming an incipient pan-Islamic identity, :::l v. 
leir but they also socialize with Latino, Caribbean, African American, 
:fil- and Asian students. For example, an Indian Muslim studl!nt, Is-
Lity n1ail, argued for a more expansive conception of community: "I 
lve hang out with different kids . . .I say if you 'want to live in a dif-
in· ferent \vorld, you have to exist with them . . .  Sometimes you have 
ClU- to go outside [your group] and say, yeah, alright, we are friends 
:ter too . . .  your relationship is gonna be bigger, right." 
lId What was striking was the ways in which some South Asian 
lity Muslim youth seemed to go beyond simply expressing ideas of 
[in- cultural -difference and commonality, in a lllulticulturalist vein, 
the to actually grapple with ideas about political and structural simi-
e a larities others. Some of the students had gained a deeper under-
the standing of their commonalities with African American youth 
de· as a result of their experiences with anti-Muslim racism, which 
ice. they compared to anti-Black racism. Other South Asian immigrant 
ani youth, particularly the Muslim boys, felt targeted by other high 
)ns school youth after 9 / 11 .  Accusations of "you're a terrorist" or 
rea "you're a bin Laden" entered into what might otherwise be just 
ler- an outbreak of youthful aggression among boys, perhaps, but 
Ire· had now become a part of a national discourse about 1s1a111. Yet, 
r of some of the boys, in particular, who had been targets of anti-Mus-
ere lim incidents felt closer to the experiences of racial profiling en-
;ed dured by African Americans, as a result, and shared a critique of 
Ira- the U.S.'s racist policies toward people of color. One of the boys 
the commented that, in his view, African Americans were not as shat-
.1U- tered by the 9 / 11 attacks on the U.S. because they feel alienated 
ted from the nation-state due to the legacy of slavery. While this ra-
on cialized difference after 9 / 11 is obviously more complex, what 
.cal is important is that some youth believed that African Americans 
en- share their experience of marginalized cultural citizenship ,vithin 
17 
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the nation. While these young people are not involved in formal 
political organizations, they had a political analysis of the post-
9 / 11 climate that led to inter-racial affiliations. 
In the Boston area, there were instances of formal alliances 
on an organizational level between South Asian and Arab Ameri-
can commun.ities and civil and immigrant rights organizations. 
For example, after 9 / 11, members of the Massachusetts chapter 
of the American Arab Anti-DiSCrimination Committee, a national 
civil rights organization, as well as of the South Asian Committee on 
Human Rights, a grassroots gtoup in the Boston area .. participated 
in the New England Immigrant and Detainees Right Network .. a 
coalition that included Asian Anlerican, Latino(a), and white im-
migrant and civil. right activists and that organized around Special 
Registration, deten.tion, and deportations. There \vere also joint 
activities focused on persecution of Arab, South Asian, and Mus-
lim Americans organized by a loose network of Asian, Latino, 
Brazilian, and Haitian civil and immigrant rights groups. It is not 
clear yet what the long-lasting impact of these alliances \-vill be, 
but these coalitions have raised important questions about secu-
larism and civil rights; race and religion, and nationalism and class. 
Alliances 
One of the interestiIlg things to note in the political rhetoric used 
by those discussing, and even protesting, the "racial profiling" of 
South Asian, Arab, and Muslim Americans is that the racial am-
biguities of all three categories are generally not fully acknowl-
edged in this discourse. Moustafa Bayoumi calls this the "tragic 
irony" of "racial profiling" after 9/ 11.61 Muslim identity is not, 
technically, a racial category but in speaking of "anti-Muslim rac-
ism," for example, it is apparent that Muslim identity is treat-
ed as if it were a racial category by processes that are similar to 
those that comprise racial profiling in the U.S., for example, "fly-
ing while Muslinl," referring to the profiling of Muslim and Arab 
passengers at airports and on airplanes, or "speaking out while 
Arab/ Palestinian/' referring to the censorship of pro-Palestine 
political speech. Race is, after all, a social and ideological con-
struction and so the criminalization of Muslim Americans shows 
that Islam increasingly operates as a racial category in public dis-
course as well as practice. 
Arabs and South Asians are both groups that have been am-
biguously racialized in the U.S., variously classified as "white" 
and non-white at different moments. In 1923, the Supreme Court 
... - ..... -............ .. .. . 
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nal ruled that Bhagat Singh Thind, an Indian immigrant, was techni .. � 
)st- cally Caucasian but could not be considered \vhite in the under- 1:'.1 0--
standing of the IIcommon man" and so was ineligible for citi- $: c: 
.ces zenship.62 In general, Asian Americans have been positioned in � �r 
eri- various ways between the American racial polarity of black and -Vl 
white. As Gary Okihiro has observed, at some moments gr()ups 0 ms. c: 
) ter of Asian Americans have been considered linear black" and at 9-;t> 
Inal others, 1/ almost white."63 VI Qj' 
Arabs were called "Syrians" \vhen they first migrated to the ::J ! on ;t> 
ted U.S. in large numbers, around the turn of the twentieth century. 3 � 
k, a Al though officially considered IIwhite," their el igibility for nat- t:;" Q.I 
im- uralization came into dispute in certain locations, especially in ::J 1,1> 
cial parts of the South and in northern industrial cities where they 
)int were union laborers.64 In a Southern case, the appellate court 
us- ruled in Dow v. The United States (1915) that IJSyrians" \vere of 
no, the Semitic branch of the Caucasian race and thus eligible for 
not U.S. citizenship.65 In Detroit, John Mohammed Ali argued be-
be, fore a U.S. District Court (1925) in a case that sought to revoke 
cu- his naturalization (based on the Thind decision) that although he 
:tSs. ·was born in India, he was Arabian, since his ancestors had origi-
nated in Arabia. The judge replied that Ali's ancestry was not 
at issue . He had dark skin and fit all the other criteria that de-
sed fined the "common understanding" of non-white. Judges in De-, of troit and Buffalo consistently denied Arabs naturalization rights, 
lm- without issuing written opinions that could be appealed.66 Many 
wl- Arabs have rejected their official designation as Caucasian and 
Igic white, because of their treatment in American society (a senti-
lOt, ment crystallized after 9/ 11), because Arabs c�mprise a range of 
'ac- phenotypes and cannot be contained by the concept of race, and 
�at- because they basically disagree with organizing people by color. 
r to As long as they remain officially \vhite, they are, ineligible for the 
fly- benefits that accrue to members of recognized minority groups 
rab and, more critically, they remain invisible to persons concerned 
liIe with the status of minorities.67 
ine While some had thought Arabs and Muslims were on the 
on- path to gaining cultural citizenship in the U.S., post-9/ 11 events 
IWS changed all that. The questions nearly all have been asked, such 
lis- as Uwhere are you from?" and "are you a terrorist?," and comments 
ml-
telling them to " go back where you came from" revealed the bor-
derlines between whiteness and otherness. The overwhelming 
.te" consistency of responses in a post-9/ 11 study indicating that Arab-
lurt Americans feel least safe among whites shows that violent back-
19 
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lash is a phenomenon associated by them 'with white America. 
The everyday cultural and social processes that accompany the 
state-driven "war on terror" construct Arabs and Muslims as not 
entitled to the same rights and privileges (i.e., cultural citizenship) 
that accrue to members of white society or /lreal" Americans, in­
cluding the privilege against profiling and guilt by association. 
Federal government actions only serve to reinforce this idea. One 
often hears Muslims in Chicago remark that after the Oklahoma 
City bombings by Timothy McVeigh and his associates, nei ther 
all Christians nor all Irish became suspect citizens. The privileged 
are treated ,vith individual precision, the non-privileged are pro­
filed and punished collectively. However, since heightened U.S. 
nationalism and xenophobia have filtered into other immigrant 
and minority communities, some parts of these communities have 
absorbed anti-Arab racism and Islamophobia, making this a more 
complex and difficult issue.68 
For many South Asian and Arab AmericansJ the post-9/11 
backlash was a lesson in the ideological construction of race in 
the U.S. Some who believed that they would be shielded from 
racism because they \vere wealthy and inhabited predominantly 
white spaces found their "model minority" status stripped from 
them. It i� important to show links between the social position­
ing of Arab and South Asian Americans to Uncover the 'ways in 
which racial formation in the U.S. conjoins issues of material privi­
lege, legal regulation, and state power. There are important alli­
ances that need to be forged between these and other communi­
ties that ,vould go beyond the confines of multiculturalist II differ­
ence" and build connections based on an analysis of political and 
material processes. For example, South Asian, Arab, and Muslim 
Americans who now have heightened concerns about issues of 
detention have much to learn from African Americans, Latinos, 
and Native Americans who have long fought against racism­
especially that of the prison-industrial complex, and advocated 
for the rights of political prisoners. They have much to learn as 
well as from the historical experiences of Japanese Americans, 
who were incarcerated during World War II. The latter alliance 
was made more visibly than the first after 9/11, through pub:' 
lic statements of solidarity by Japanese American activists and 
documentary films that visually linked the experiences of both 
communities. Yet in order for there to be a deeper alliance be­
tween subordinated groups in the U.S., these symbolic alliances 
need to go beyond a politics of representation and address the 
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. historical impact of U.S. empire. Yet it is also true that responses 
by South Asian, Arab, and Muslim Americans themselves often 
remain \vithin the realm of the symbolic and are enacted through 
protests that make visual and discursive statemehts, instead of 
ongoing political campaigns that challenge the very premise and 
goals of the state's profiling and link it larger imperial policies in 
the Middle East and South Asia. 
Conclusion 
The question of whether and how Arab Americans and South 
Asian Americans should \york together, and how to define the 
relationship of Arab Americans to Asian Americans, raises two 
important issues mentioned at the beginning of this essay: the 
meaning of solidarity, and second, the role of boundari�s. Soli­
darity, Vijay Prashad reminds us, is a desire that is actualized 
through a " tremendous act of production" for NUllity is not wait­
ing to happen.u69 The identities that bind Asian Americans to 
Arab Americans need not be just of shared victirnhood, but could 
be based in shared histories of contact and trade preceding West­
ern hegemony, in common visions of liberation from colonialism, 
in collective memories of nationalist struggle, and in the alliances 
forged between newly independent Arab and South Asian na­
tion-states by the non-aligned movement.70 It is in this political 
and epistemological spirit that we need to reconsider the bound­
aries between Asian American and Arab American studies. A 
strategicallY 'cotuparative approach rooted in a shared history 
and vision of solidarity, rejecting externally imposed divisions, 
·would help keep in sight the political \york of boundaries: aca­
demic, geographic, and cultural. 
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65. In the 1990s, nearly 100 years later, while blatant racially based legislation 
would be considered unconstitutional, legislative efforts that effectively 
targeted some American ethnic groups more than others were on the in­
crease. For Arab-Americans, the Anti-Terrorism Law is one such effort. 
On a social level; Arab-Americans increasingly report being treated as a 
people "different" from the white American core group (Naff, 1985). 
66. ·INS, "Eligibility of Arabs to Naturalization," INS MOlltMy Review 1 (Octo­
ber 1943), 13 . 
67. See Louise Cainkar, "The Arab American Experience and the Social Con­
struction of Difference" Journal of American Ethnic History. Twenty-Fifth Au­
niversary Issue. Immigralioll, Incorporatioll, Integration, aud Trallsllationalism: 
68. 
69. 
70. 
Illterdisciplinary lIlld Illiematiollnl Perspecfh'es 25:2 and 25:3 Winter-Spring. 
Cainkar, forthcoming; Tram Nguyen, We Arc All Suspects Now: Untold Sto­
ries from Immigrant Communities After 9/11 (Boston: Beacon Press, 2005) . 
Vijay Prashad, The Knrma oj Brown Folk (Minneapolis: University of Min­
nesota Press, 2000). 
Cultural commonalities are useful and resonant in the emotional and aes­
thetic ties that bind people to one another, and there arc certalnly deep 
connections between Arab and South Asian Americans through language, 
religion, art, architecture, poetry, family ties, and sodal relationships, among 
so many other realms of culture. But as with Asian American pan-ethnic­
it)" it is the historical traditions, tied to a shared political vision, that offer 
a rhore complex and critical basis for solidarity. Similar d iscussions and 
debates have occurred at different moments in Asian American studies 
about the relationship of Filipino Americans, Southeast Asian Americans, 
South Asian Americans, and Pacific Islanders to Asian American pan-eth­
nic identity, as Asian American studies has shifted away from its tradi­
tional preoccupation with Chinese American and Japanese American ex­
periences. In rethinking the issue of margins and mainstreams in the field, 
it has been apparent that a politics of multiculturalist inclusion is not suf­
ficient, without a rethinking of structural relations between center and pe­
riphery. The goals of a pan-ethnic project such as Asian American studies 
should not be to appropriate, subsume, or colonize other areas of study, 
but rather, as George Lipsitz points out, to focus "on objects of study that 
confound conventional modes of inquiry. Consequently.. Asian American 
studies is not limited to the study of Asian Americans, but rather uses the 
specific historical experiences of Asian Americans to produce comparative 
studies of the role national cultures play in forming citizens" and to devel­
op a "model of interethnic antiracism" (George Lipsitz, American Studies 
in a Moment of Da/lger, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001, .' 
123-124). 
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